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Obstacles to pH1N1 Vaccine Availability
The Complex Contracting Relationship between 
Vaccine Manufacturers, the World Health 
Organization, and Donor and Beneficiary 
Governments
SaM F. halabi
Introduction
When researchers in Mexico and the United States concluded that 
influenza-related hospitalizations in separate, noncontiguous areas of Mexico, 
southern California, and New York City uniquely affected children and young 
adults, they were alerted to the possibility that a new pandemic viral subtype 
of influenza had emerged (Cordova-Villalobos et al., 2009; see also Chapter 2). 
After the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) received 
samples from two early H1N1 patients in mid April, 2009, researchers exposed 
banked blood samples taken before and after vaccinations from 2005 to the 
new virus (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009). Samples from 
children produced no antibodies whereas samples from adults vaccinated 
against seasonal flu showed a slight increase in antibodies against the pH1N1 
virus. Because it did not appear that the seasonal vaccine would adequately pro-
tect adults against infection, the CDC recommended development of a vaccine 
specific to the new strain (Hancock et al., 2009). This recommendation was 
echoed in the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) June 11, 2009, declaration 
of a Phase 6 pandemic. Under WHO classificatory scheme operating in 2009 
(it has been revised in light of the H1N1 experience), in Phases 1 through 3 of 
a pandemic, influenza circulates predominantly in animals and there are few 
human infections. In Phase 4, there is sustained human-to-human transmis-
sion, and in Phases 5 and 6, sustained human transmission spreads to at least 
two WHO regions (Doshi, 2011).
CHAPTER 12
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The CDC’s recommendation and WHO’s declaration triggered a race by 
a small number of vaccine manufacturers to develop and then put into pro-
duction a pandemic-specific vaccine because a market had instantaneously 
developed and some manufacturers already had in place agreements with gov-
ernments that required them to shift to pandemic vaccine production (Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012; World Health Organization, 2011). 
Aside from the governments that had already put procurement policies and 
contracts in place, the vast majority of the world’s governments and the popula-
tions they represented lacked access to vaccines and looked to WHO to work 
with firms and potential donor governments to facilitate access. The gene 
sequence of wild-type pandemic pH1N1 was made publicly available April 27, 
2009. By May 8, 2009, samples of wild-type virus had been sent from refer-
ence laboratories to vaccine manufacturers, all of which were in Europe and 
the United States, because they had the necessary high-level biological contain-
ment facilities. This chapter analyzes the obstacles standing between WHO, 
vaccine manufacturers, and the populations who needed the vaccines they 
produced.
Vaccines are the first line of defense against influenza to prevent infec-
tion and to control spread of the disease because they are more effective and 
burden society less than nonpharmaceutical measures like masks, closing of 
public gathering places, and isolation of patients (Aledort et al., 2007; Carter 
and Plosker, 2008). The process by which a vaccine is first developed in a 
laboratory to its administration to a population engages the full range of gov-
ernmental health agencies, community organizations, pharmaceutical firms, 
and international organizations that comprise the system the U.S. National 
Health Security Strategy sets at the core of improving public health emergency 
response.
Although recent pandemic influenza threats have originated in middle- or 
low-income countries, the capacity for pandemic influenza vaccine produc-
tion is overwhelmingly concentrated in Australia, Europe, and North America 
(Crosse, 2008). These regions’ pharmaceutical firms are in a persistent cycle of 
seasonal influenza vaccine production, which is based on surveillance reports 
detailing which influenza viruses are in circulation, how they are spreading, 
and how well the previous season’s vaccine viruses protect against new strains. 
Although WHO recommends specific vaccine viruses after information is 
gathered from more than 100 national influenza centers in more than 100 
countries, individual countries make their own decisions about licensing of 
vaccines subject to their own regulatory mechanisms.
When a new influenza strain emerges, the first step in vaccine response 
is to assess whether the seasonal influenza vaccine will produce adequate 
immunity to protect against the new strain. After researchers concluded the 
seasonal vaccine did not protect against pH1N1, pharmaceutical firms, five 
of which control approximately 80% of the influenza vaccine market, found 
themselves negotiating with WHO about conditions for donation, shipment, 
and distribution of vaccine. Governments with preexisting contracts sought 
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to preserve as much of their firms’ capacity—that is, firms located within the 
territorial borders of the procuring governments—as necessary to inoculate 
their populations first before giving or selling to others. As a result, manu-
facturers negotiated with a much larger than usual number of procurement 
officials, regulators, health-care providers, and vaccine distributors (Hanquet 
et al., 2011).
From the manufacturers’ perspective, these negotiations occurred in the 
shadow of potentially large liabilities related to their existing contractual 
arrangements with governments; detailed processes for vaccine approval, dis-
tribution, and marketing; and more general exposure should quickly developed 
vaccines generate unexpected adverse reactions or safety problems. Indeed, 
WHO prequalified some vaccines in as little as one day, even when ongoing 
studies showed significant adverse events (World Health Organization, 2010). 
Manufacturers were required to seek approval as if it were an entirely new 
vaccine. Under typical regimes, manufacturers must modify the new virus 
to grow efficiently (generally in eggs) so it may be used for vaccine produc-
tion. This modification also ensures the vaccine virus may be handled safely. 
To develop antigens and injectable antiserum to measure vaccine potency, 
manufacturers must coordinate with reference laboratories and regulatory 
agencies. Vaccines must then be tested in human trials to assess safety and 
effectiveness. Regulatory approval for marketing and use is dependent on 
laboratory-generated evidence and clinical trial outcomes. Even safe and effec-
tive vaccines generate adverse events among those inoculated, ranging from 
(common) soreness at the injection site to fever, discomfort, and muscle pain to 
(rare) anaphylaxis and oculorespiratory syndrome (World Health Organization, 
2012). One of the vaccines produced specifically for pH1N1 by GlaxoSmithKline 
has been associated with an increased risk of narcolepsy (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2013). In many jurisdictions, manufacturers bear legal 
responsibility for these adverse events.
Manufacturers therefore face a range of legal barriers to production, dona-
tion, and discounted sale of pandemic vaccines like the process by which vac-
cines may be approved and registered with national regulatory authorities, 
protection from and indemnification for liability, and preexisting advance 
market commitment agreements that affect the ability to enter into additional 
contracts after a pandemic has been declared. In short, the global public health 
response is dependent on private-sector actors who must balance private-sector 
and public-sector demands on their resources.
Methods
Contracts between private parties are rarely available for public scrutiny unless 
litigation exposes them. Similarly, agreements between private-sector actors 
and public authorities are kept confidential in most circumstances unless they 
are specifically covered by open records laws, the bidding process for them 
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requires a high degree of transparency, or private-sector actors themselves 
make some or all of the agreements available. Confidentiality of agreements is 
particularly important when the agreement potentially affects national defense 
or security—circumstances that generally characterize governmental strate-
gies for dealing with pandemics.
However, many aspects of the relationships between vaccine manufac-
turers, WHO, and donor and beneficiary governments have been revealed 
through testimonies before legislative bodies, postpandemic analyses under-
taken by WHO, including a comprehensive assessment of its response, and 
conversations and interviews with persons representing governments, firms, 
and WHO. These primary sources were supplemented by analyses of the 
2009 pH1N1 vaccine development and distribution problem published in the 
academic literature to develop as comprehensive picture as possible of vaccine 
contracting obstacles.
This document review was also supplemented by informal interviews 
with decision makers, many of whom did not have time for extensive, formal 
interviews. The data collected from the academic literature, WHO reports, 
and interviews were organized according to major legal obstacles, which 
were then vetted with public health researchers, practitioners, governmental 
officials, and one representative from a vaccine manufacturer to maximize 
the chance that all key issues were captured and no critical concerns were 
excluded. Although these methods cannot tell us the frequency with which 
specific issues arose, they are sufficient to ensure the major contracting obsta-
cles facing manufacturers, governments, and WHO have been identified and 
explored.
Other issues also affected vaccine distribution, including supply line 
breaks, and inconsistencies and inadequate infrastructure to distribute vac-
cines once the legal uncertainties just described were resolved (see, for exam-
ple, Chapter  10), but are beyond the scope of this chapter. Those problems 
included the availability and resilience of cold chain packaging, shelf-life, and 
planning within both public-sector actors such as the United Nations’ (UN) 
Office for Project Services, UNICEF, and development agencies, along with 
private-sector actors like global logistics firms.
Results
The Legal Framework for pH1N1 Pandemic  
Influenza Vaccine Distribution
Development, approval, and distribution of the 2009 pH1N1 vaccine was 
shaped by preexisting frameworks that had been established to address the 
outbreak of H5N1 avian flu in Southeast Asia (McConnell, 2010). That subtype 
spread quickly around the globe but did not (and has not to date) evolved to 
become easily transmissible to humans. The concern that H5N1 may become 
easily transmissible to and then between humans resulted in both divergent 
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(if accelerated) regulatory approval processes, and a set of agreements entered 
into between two manufacturers—GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Sanofi Pasteur 
(Sanofi)—and the WHO donations of antivirals and prepandemic H5N1 vac-
cine doses. After the pN1H1 influenza strain was identified, WHO immediately 
began negotiations with “all known” influenza vaccine manufacturers (World 
Health Organization, 2011). Those discussions were shaped by planning for 
H5N1 (Hanquet et al., 2011).
When the WHO declared a Phase 6 pandemic, GSK and Sanofi pledged 
50 million and 60 million doses of H5N1 vaccine, respectively, although no 
legal agreements for donations were in place. GSK and Sanofi agreed to convert 
those commitments to pandemic influenza A pH1N1 vaccine and to increase 
the number of doses to 150  million. GSK and WHO signed an agreement 
for the donations on November 10, 2009, which resulted in just over 24 mil-
lion doses actually donated. Sanofi announced a “flexible” donation of up to 
100 million doses on June 17, 2009, but the donation agreement was not signed 
until December 2009. Novartis specifically eschewed donations, favoring pric-
ing mechanisms to establish a “sustainable way” to deliver vaccine to develop-
ing countries.
Despite the small number of players, negotiations regarding all aspects 
of procurement were difficult and protracted, revealing a near-total lack of 
planning to move vaccine from the private-sector developers and manufac-
turers to the populations that needed them. Negotiations involved at least 
four manufacturers and 12 governments on the donor side, and nearly 100 
governments on the beneficiary side (World Health Organization, 2011). 
WHO’s negotiation with GSK served as a template for agreements with 
CSL Australia, MedImmune, and Sanofi, which concluded in December 
2009. Novartis signed an agreement in January 2010, although a 2011 WHO 
assessment of its response to the pandemic strongly suggests the Novartis 
agreement differed from the other four. Legal agreements with govern-
ments followed those with firms:  the United States (December 16, 2009), 
Australia (December 22, 2009), France (January 15, 2010), Belgium (January 
29, 2010), Switzerland (March 16, 2010), Norway (March 19, 2010), Italy 
(April 16, 2010), the United Kingdom (May 28, 2010), and Singapore (June 
21, 2010). Some states perceived that WHO “shopped” different agreements 
with different legal terms to different governments—a practice that gener-
ated suspicion among the donor governments and caused further delay in 
finalizing terms.
The delay in placing agreements between firms, governments, and WHO 
was attributable to at least two causes. First, both firms and governments 
had entered into advance purchase agreements that constrained the ability 
of firms to donate or otherwise provide vaccines to WHO or governments 
directly. Second, vaccine manufacturers insisted on strong protections from 
liability should the pandemic influenza vaccine result in adverse health events 
in populations, and coverage for interests affected by specific title transfer 
arrangements.
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Advance Purchase Agreements and Territorial Restraints
Long before WHO declared a pandemic, many countries, including Belgium, 
Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom, had already placed large orders of 
pH1N1 vaccine or had advanced agreements in place (Doshi and Jefferson, 
2010). With advance purchase agreements (also known as sleeping contracts), a 
vaccine manufacturer agrees to supply its pandemic influenza vaccine as soon 
as possible after a pandemic has been declared and agrees to reserve a specified 
number of doses for the country or to more openly meet that country’s orders 
first. When it commenced negotiations with manufacturers, WHO did not 
know about key aspects of the agreements. When asked whether they would 
be willing to reserve (not donate) 10% of real-time production for purchase 
by UN agencies, many vaccine manufacturers cited advance purchase agree-
ments with high-income countries as a barrier. Contracting states noted the 
relatively inflexible terms of those agreements. A review of European Union 
member states’ vaccine planning strategies after the pandemic highlighted the 
obstacles advanced purchase agreements pose:
From the contracting country’s perspective, it is clear that maximizing not 
only guaranteed access to vaccine, but also increased flexibility that can help 
to minimize costs and better calibrate orders to changing prognoses regarding 
the ongoing development of the pandemic. Convincing vaccine [manufacturers] 
to provide such flexibility is likely to pose a challenge and might well require 
finding ways of enhancing the negotiating power of contracting Member States. 
A forum for discussions among Member States of how to develop advance pur-
chase contracts could be useful. (European Commission (2010)
Even aside from advance purchase agreements, the decision to dedicate 
physical infrastructure and human resources to pandemic influenza vac-
cine production is, from the manufacturers’ view, a business decision. In a 
2010 WHO report examining operational successes and failures of WHO 
Deployment Initiative (the umbrella term WHO used to describe its effort to 
procure vaccines from firms and governments, and to distribute them to needy 
countries), pharmaceutical firms noted that “support for WHO Deployment 
Initiative may have disrupted business in other areas and reduced their com-
petitive strength” (World Health Organization, 2010, p.  9). Vaccine manu-
facturers, therefore, desire stockpiling agreements as a solution to business 
uncertainty, whereas procuring governments demand flexibility to fit the 
severity of the pandemic. The 2009 pH1N1 influenza pandemic has exacer-
bated this tension between firms and the governments wealthy enough to pro-
cure advanced vaccine production, and therefore what is left for populations in 
lesser developed or middle-income states. After the pH1N1 threat diminished, 
many more governments entered into advance purchase agreements with a 
wider divergence in legal terms for a larger number of doses of pandemic or 
prepandemic vaccine.
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In addition to and accompanying advance purchase agreements, domestic 
law may nevertheless constrain the production and shipment environment 
of vaccine manufacturers. For example, GSK’s facility in Sainte Foy, Quebec, 
must fill Canada’s orders first before supplying to others, and Canada awarded 
its pandemic influenza vaccine contract to a Canadian company precisely 
because it feared foreign governments would restrict exports of vaccine doses 
(Fidler, 2010; Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Parliament of 
Canada, 2010). The Australian government made it clear to the Australian 
manufacturer CSL that it must fulfill the government’s domestic needs before 
exporting pH1N1 vaccine (Fidler, 2010). Despite clear acknowledgment that the 
2009 outbreak originated in Mexico and leveled its most significant toll there, 
Mexico had “a terrifically difficult time getting access to the pandemic vaccine” 
as a result of the difficulties in assessing needs and distributing vaccines to 
target populations across the globe (Halabi, 2014, p. 148).
Regulatory Approval and Legal Liabilities
Each country’s national regulatory authority responding to the pandemic 
imposed its own regulatory process for approving pH1N1 vaccines, autho-
rizing their importation, and overseeing their distribution (World Health 
Organization, 2010). These processes ranged from one-time waivers of normal 
rules to detailed requirements for pediatric subgroup data, regulatory assess-
ments capacity, quality control preparedness and capacity, and postmarket-
ing safety surveillance and field assessment of efficacy and immunogenicity. 
Some regulatory agencies approved pandemic vaccines as a type of seasonal 
influenza vaccine, whereas others adapted an approval process in place for can-
didate H5N1 (avian flu) vaccines. The biochemistry of pH1N1 vaccines varied 
widely, with adjuvanted vaccines (an adjuvant is an inorganic or organic chemi-
cal, macromolecule, or entire cell of certain killed bacteria that enhance the 
immune response to an antigen) and vaccines produced using cell- rather than 
egg-based technology facing more significant regulatory review. In more than 
half the beneficiary countries, prequalification of a vaccine by WHO was not 
sufficient to obtain regulatory approval, and relatively few countries’ national 
laws stated that products donated by the UN did not require national registra-
tion (World Health Organization, 2010).
These requirements, in turn, adversely affected efficacious donation and 
distribution. Even when a manufacturer agreed in principle to donate to WHO 
or other UN agencies (e.g., UNICEF), it might not agree to do so if the vaccine 
would be distributed in a country where that vaccine is not licensed (Crosse, 
2008). Since at least 2006, industry representatives have stated that manufac-
turers would need advance assurance that governments would provide liability 
protection in order to donate vaccines. Indeed, some manufacturers will not 
even authorize use of the vaccine for clinical trials if not insured against legal 
liabilities. Because the initial urgency of the pandemic response required an 
unprecedented number of doses of a new vaccine to be deployed globally in 
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a period of only a few months, vaccine manufacturers required that all pur-
chasers or recipients (many of which were European and North American gov-
ernments) indemnify them for adverse events resulting from the use of the 
pandemic H1N1 vaccine, with exceptions allowed for failure to follow current 
good manufacturing processes or other discrete specifications.
Manufacturers required access to information on country regulatory pro-
cesses that was often difficult to obtain. Reallocating products after this work 
had begun led to additional work for manufacturers and delayed delivery to 
countries (World Health Organization, 2010). In one instance, a change in the 
delivery schedule necessitated switching to the product of a different manu-
facturer, which triggered a de novo review of all aspects of vaccine approval 
(World Health Organization, 2010). The delays caused by this legal wran-
gling were substantial. For countries in WHO’s African region, vaccines were 
deployed, on average, 261 days after a country expressed interest in donated 
vaccine (World Health Organization, 2010). Legal issues surrounding both 
title and transfer between manufacturers, governments, and beneficiary coun-
tries added to the delay (World Health Organization, 2010). “For those coun-
tries that were first hit by the emerging pandemic, like those in the Southern 
Hemisphere, but also for some countries in the Northern Hemisphere, the 
vaccines clearly came too late and well after the pandemic struck” (Osterhaus 
et al., 2011, p. 2769).
The complexity of this contracting universe explains, in part, discrepancies 
in pledged versus contractually committed vaccines. Availability of supply and 
differing appreciation of available safety and efficacy data influenced where and 
under what circumstances certain vaccines could be deployed to certain coun-
tries (Luetiegn, 2011). By the end of WHO Deployment Initiative in September 
2010, 200 million doses of pandemic influenza A (pH1N1) 2009 vaccine had 
been pledged for donation, but only 122.5 million doses had been committed 
contractually. In total, 78 million doses of pandemic influenza A (pH1N1) 2009 
were deployed to 77 countries.
Implications for Policy and Practice
Although vaccines are the first line of defense to prevent infection and to con-
trol spread of pandemic influenza, the capability to develop and manufacture 
vaccine is almost entirely under the control of a small number of large phar-
maceutical firms whose ability and willingness to respond to a pandemic are 
fundamentally intertwined with their regulatory and contractual relationships. 
If a seasonal vaccine is inadequate against a new pandemic influenza strain, 
which occurred with pH1N1, manufacturers must modify the new virus, coor-
dinate with reference laboratories and regulatory agencies, conduct human 
trials, and decide whether, and to what extent, to switch seasonal vaccine 
production to pandemic vaccine production. In 2009, some agreements in 
place between firms and governments effectively forced this choice (Hanquet 
AQ: Please 
provide com-
plete reference 
details for 
cross-refer-
ence Luetiegn 
(2011) in the 
reference list.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Nov 04 2014, NEWGEN
med-9780190209247.indd   210 11/4/2014   5:56:35 AM
obStacleS to ph1n1 vaccine avail abilit Y | 211 
et al., 2011). Vaccines must then be tested in human trials to assess safety and 
effectiveness. Regulatory approval for marketing and use is dependent on 
laboratory-generated evidence and clinical trial outcomes. Even safe and effec-
tive vaccines generate adverse events among those inoculated, and in many 
jurisdictions manufacturers bear legal responsibility for these adverse events 
(Swendiman and Jones, 2009).
Each of these aspects of the vaccine development process generated con-
tracting obstacles when WHO and individual governments approached firms 
with requests for vaccine donation or purchase. Manufacturers faced differing 
regulatory and approval processes, uncertain protection from legal liabilities, 
constraints imposed by advance purchase agreements in place with mostly 
European and North American countries, and equally uncertain and undevel-
oped systems for distribution even if they could manufacture a limitless num-
ber of doses. In short, the global public health response to pandemic influenza 
in 2009 was dependent on private-sector actors who, under the circumstances 
then prevailing, demanded both legal assurances and relief from legal require-
ments in order to participate fully in that response. There were few effective 
mechanisms for dealing with that reality. An effective global strategy for the 
next influenza pandemic will require the identification of these contracting 
and regulatory obstacles, anticipation of new ones, and the creation of ex ante 
agreements and negotiation for that may facilitate vaccine development and 
distribution.
Although efforts are underway to increase vaccine manufacturing capacity 
in developing states, the capability remains overwhelmingly centered in large 
pharmaceutical firms located in Australia, Japan, Europe, and North America. 
There is a substantial consensus that capacity for vaccine production is tiny 
compared with the number of doses required in the event of the next pan-
demic. WHO, as well as North American and European governments, are 
funding programs to increase the supply of seasonal and pandemic influenza 
vaccines by expanding global coverage of seasonal flu vaccine, promoting new 
development sites (including in developing states), and enhancing research 
and development for novel influenza vaccines (Condon and Tapen, 2010).
WHO is optimistic the agreements put in place between donor govern-
ments and firms between November 2009 and March 2010 will provide a 
time-saving legal framework for production and distribution of vaccine or 
other medicines during the next pandemic (World Health Organization, 
2010). However, there are reasons to doubt this will be the case based on sys-
temwide response changes. For example, one of the controversial aspects of 
vaccine development and distribution between 2009 and 2010 was WHO’s 
criteria for identifying a pandemic. Those criteria were based in some mea-
sure on geographic spread rather than severity. WHO has agreed to revise 
these criteria so that the next time it declares a pandemic, the declaration 
will reflect a more severe public health event on a widespread scale—a sce-
nario likely to render existing legal agreements less applicable than WHO now 
hopes (Doshi, 2011).
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As far as the 2009 pH1N1 experience goes, building capacity without a con-
sistently updated framework for efficiently moving pandemic vaccine from the 
private sector to the public sphere may simply aggravate the legal and regu-
latory bottlenecks experienced between 2009 and 2010. The expansion of 
capacity in middle-income or developing countries enhances the contracting 
complexity that will likely be faced during the next pandemic. No agreements 
were reached with firms that are not members of the International Federation 
of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations, which does not include the 
small but growing number of manufacturers in developing countries. For the 
most part, vaccine manufacturers and major purchasers still decide whether 
to suspend seasonal influenza vaccine production so that all production capac-
ity can be used for pandemic vaccine. Manufacturers also decide whether 
production of pandemic vaccine can be safely scaled down or suspended in 
favor of seasonal vaccine. Advance agreements should exist between industry, 
WHO, and countries regarding these decisions or should at least create ongo-
ing forums that keep relevant stakeholders current on a regular basis on how 
vaccine manufacturers’ commitments affect overall capacity for production in 
the case of a pandemic.
Approval processes for national regulatory authorities created a major obsta-
cle not just for initial agreements to donate, but also for logistical practicalities 
that favored deployment of pandemic vaccines as quickly as possible to coun-
tries that needed them as soon as possible. As with the vaccine framework 
developed for H1N1, regulatory harmonization has been shaped by pre-2009 
preparations for emergence of a pandemic H5N1 influenza virus strain. WHO, 
in collaboration with health authorities from Canada, Japan, Spain, and the 
United States, convened three technical workshops between 2006 and 2007 
to examine regulatory harmonization, but the results are shaped by detailed 
examination of countries with clear regulatory mandates and at least one major 
vaccine manufacturer. The 2009 H1N1 pandemic has not resulted in a measur-
able increase in agreements between national regulatory authorities or with 
WHO on data sharing, mutual recognition, of some or all aspects of vaccine 
approval.
Moreover, the difficulty lesser developed and middle-income countries 
experienced in obtaining pandemic H1N1 vaccine exacerbated already exist-
ing tensions over the process of developing medicines and vaccines (which 
frequently involves the use of flu samples obtained in developing countries) 
and making them available at affordable prices. In 2007, Indonesia withheld 
samples of influenza A  (H5N1) from WHO, arguing that developing coun-
tries typically shared such samples for free only to have North American and 
European firms patent derivative medicines and vaccines for sale in richer 
states, out of reach (in financial and other terms) from developing countries. 
In response, WHO and the World Health Assembly adopted the Pandemic 
Influenza Preparedness Framework, under which member states and vaccine 
manufacturers have agreed on a standard material transfer agreement that 
regulates the terms under which countries agree to donate influenza samples, 
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the entities authorized to receive and research them, and the corresponding 
sharing of resulting vaccines and other intellectual properties (Halabi, 2014). 
WHO is currently negotiating with six vaccine manufacturers based on the 
standard material transfer agreement, with one agreement concluded with 
GSK. These agreements provide several options to manufacturers regarding 
the contributions they must make in exchange for virus access. Some of these 
options involve pandemic vaccine donation, while others involve antiviral dona-
tions, and still others authorize licensing of intellectual property to developing 
country manufacturers. These agreements, especially the options manufactur-
ers choose, must coexist with the advance purchase agreements and, presum-
ably, liability issues outlined above. Together with the proliferation of advance 
purchase agreements and the unknown extent of vaccine stockpiling agree-
ments, the commitments made by manufacturers under WHO’s Pandemic 
Influenza Preparedness Framework may render the legal framework used in 
2009 obsolete.
Vaccines are the front line in the global response to the next pandemic 
influenza outbreak, and thus their manufacturers—together with public 
health agencies—form a critical public–private partnership. The seasonal–
pandemic influenza vaccine production balance; the process by which vac-
cines are developed, researched, and approved for use by regulatory agencies; 
the potential liability manufacturers face; and the contractual limitations 
imposed by advance purchase agreements all portend potential delays for the 
necessary global health response. WHO has already noted that advance agree-
ments between itself, countries, and industries should be negotiated without 
regard to virus subtype for a specified period of time (e.g., three to five years) 
and should be regularly reviewed and renewed. Countries that receive donated 
vaccine, as any purchaser of the vaccine, should adhere to the same practices 
of releasing and indemnifying manufacturers from certain legal liabilities. 
Whether donated or purchased, vaccine manufacturers have emphasized 
that liability protection is a crucial part of their participation in the broader 
response to pandemic influenza (International Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers and Associations, 2006). As WHO’s Final Report on the 
functioning of the International Health Regulations in relation to the 2009 
A(PH1N1) pandemic noted:
Despite the ultimate deployment of 78  million doses of pandemic influenza 
vaccine to 77 countries, numerous systemic difficulties impeded the timely 
distribution of donated vaccines. Among the key difficulties was a variation in 
willingness to donate, concerns about liability, complex negotiations over legal 
agreements, lack of procedures to bypass national regulatory requirements and 
limited national and local capacities to transport, store and administer vaccines. 
Some beneficiary countries felt WHO did not adequately explain that liability 
provisions included in the beneficiary agreement were the same as the liabil-
ity provisions accepted by purchasing countries. All these difficulties proved 
daunting in the midst of a pandemic; some could have been reduced by more 
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concerted preparation and advance arrangements among all interested par-
ties. (Available online at http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA64/
A64_10-en.pdf?ua=1, p. 133)
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